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NOTES 
The Constitutionality of Candidate Filing Fees 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Early in the twentieth century a "progressive impulse"1 captured 
the energies of this country's burgeoning urban middle class. Sick-
ened by the corruption and scandals of the nineteenth century and 
fearful of the rising influx of European immigration,2 the so-called 
Progressives began working for political reform. The emphasis of 
this reform was primarily structural. Rather than by a remodeling 
of the citizenry, reform was to be achieved by "a careful and scientific 
adjustment of the machinery of government for the correction of 
prevalent evils."3 Progressives pushed such reforms as initiative, re-
call, referendum, and frequent elections in the belief that these 
measures would provide closer voter supervision of elected officials. 
In addition, great emphasis was placed on reforming the ballot in 
order "to concentrate the attention of the electorate on the selection 
of a much smaller number of officials and so afford to the voters the 
opportunity of exercising more discrimination in their use of the 
franchise."4 The principal thrust in this area was the "short ballot" 
movement, which advocated a reduction in the number of elective 
offices.5 But the "short ballot" concept, with its underlying premise 
that reasoned choice was enhanced by reducing the number of choices 
to be made, also gave rise to restrictions on the number of candidates 
running for a given office. How better to restrict the number of can-
didates and to weed out the frivolous than to require the payment of 
a fee as a condition to appearance on the ballot? Thus was born the 
candidates' filing fee. 
The Progressive movement died with America's entry into the 
First World War,6 but not before several state legislatures had been 
prompted to enact filing fees.7 After the War the belief that political 
1. R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 173 (1955). 
2. Id. at 173-84. 
3. S. RussELL, PROGRESSIVE PoLm~ 33 (1914). The idea of structural reforms was 
perhaps most graphically expressed in a speech by an opponent of these reforms, Chief 
Justice Taft: 
With our genius for machinery, and a forced analogy from the strides we have 
made in labor-saving devices and in reducing the cost of production, we seem to 
think that all we need in order to create a government of the highest efficiency 
and morality and usefulness, is to discover some patent device to do this, without 
any special effort at improving the individuals who are its members. 
Address by (later) Chief Justice Taft, Fifteenth Annual Dinner of the Pennsylvania 
Society, Dec. 13, 1913. 
4. H. CROLY, PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRACY 289 (1914). 
5. See E. BULLOCK, SHORT BALLOT (1915). 
6. See R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 1, at 273. 
7. See, e.g., Ch. 4, § 45, [1893] Minn. Laws 27-28: Ch. 241, § 1, [1903] Tenn. Acts 
553; Ch. 66, § 5, [1905] Neb. Laws 327; Ch. 109, § 4, [1905] N.D. Laws 208; Ch. 139, § 8, 
[ 558] 
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responsibility could be greatly increased by structural reform of the 
electoral system continued to hold sway. In 1930, for instance, the 
National Municipal League published "A Model Election Adminis-
tration System" that carried fonvard the notion that restrictions 
should be placed on candidates to reduce the size of the ballot. 8 One 
of the restrictions proposed by the model act was "to require a sub-
stantial filing fee of each candidate, with provision that any candidate 
who receives a fair vote will have the fee refunded to him.''9 
Apparently a majority of the states still share the League's con-
cern. All but fifteen10 have some provision dealing with the payment 
of filing fees. The continuing vitality of this concern is demonstrated 
by the fact that several legislatures have only recently approved the 
imposition of such fees.11 These restrictions are_ not without their 
detractors. Indeed, filing fees have increasingly come under fire 
as prevailing values of the nation have changed. Whereas the Pro-
gressives were concerned with restricting the ballot to achieve voting 
rationality, the dominant theme of recent electoral reforms has been 
toward increased access to the ballot.12 The result has been a conflict 
between the Progressive ideals as embodied in the filing fee systems 
and the growing restiveness of many in our society with any alleged 
restrictions on essential rights. Not surprisingly this conflict has been 
translated into constitutional litigation. 
II. FILING FEES AND AssESSMENTS 
. Schemes for filing fees are rich in their variation.13 All basically 
entail an assessment which, when paid by a candidate, entitles him 
[1907] S.D. Laws 290-91; Ch. 209, § 5, [1907] Wash. Laws 458; Ch. 404, § 7, [1909] Cal. 
Stat. 696; Ch. 124, § 7, [1915] Ore. Laws 126. 
8, One of the principal causes of our long ballot is that many persons, for one 
motive or another, run for office, though they have no expectation of being elected. 
Sometimes it is the crank; sometimes it is the young lawyer or business man who 
wishes to avail himself of free advertising. In many communities the same persons 
run for office over and over again without the least expectation of being elected. 
It is a sad commentary upon our elections that occasionally an unheard-of person 
is elected to a high office. Some means should be taken to prevent the ballot from 
being cluttered up with the names of persons who are advertisers or cranks. 
Harris, A Model Election Administration System, 19 NATL, MuN. REv. 629, 659 (1930). 
9. Id. at 659. The National Municipal League also envisioned the possibility of 
using petitions as a threshold measure but preferred fees since it was felt that petitions 
were too easily obtained because of the public's willingness to sign anything. 
10. Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, 
New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Wisc~nsin. 
11. See, e.g., Ch. 241, § 4, [1969] Del. Laws 57; No. 1079, § 34-1013, [1970] Ga. Laws 
366; Tit. 26, Ch. 5b, [1959] Okla. Laws 120. Texas recently amended its fee system to 
conform with the holding in Carter v. Dies, 321 F. Supp. 1358 (N.D. Tex. 1970), afjd. 
sub nom. Bullock v. Carter, 40 U.S.L.W. 4211 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1972) (discussed in pt. III. 
infra). See Ch. 11, § I, [1971] Tex. Laws 3443. 
12. See U.S. CONST. amends. XXV (poll taxes) &: XXVI (eighteen-year old vote); 
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1970). 
13. The statutes are compiled in Comment, The Constitutionality of Qualifying Fees 
for Political Candidates, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 109, 136-41 (1971). 
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to.have 'his name printed on the ba11ot;H but in implementing this 
general requirement distinctive provisions abound. It is precisely 
these differences that the courts have seized upon to distinguish 
between valid and invalid schemes. 
The first major distinction benveen various types of filing fees 
lies in the scope of their applicability. Some filing schemes apply only 
to those candidates running in primary elections. Other schemes 
enjoy general applicability; they require that all candidates pay the 
assessment.11s Judged on this criterion, the states with filing fees are 
almost evenly divided. Fourteen states have fees that apply to candi-
dates in general elections, 16 while the remainder of those having fee 
systems apply them only to primary elections.17 
Filing fees systems can also be differentiated on the basis of who 
collects the fees and for what purposes the fees are used. In five states 
where the fees are required for candidates in primary elections, the 
fees are paid to and utilized by the party in whose primary the candi-
date chooses to run.18 In three other states the fees are split between 
the party and the state.10 The remainder of the states provide that 
the payment be made to some state or local official.20 Most of these 
14. There are frequently other requirements that must be met in addition to the 
payment of a filing fee. They range from the signing of a declaration of candidacy to 
the somewhat more burdensome requirement of circulating a nominating petition. 
15. Under this heading are included the fee systems of states that make entry into 
the primary election mandatory for all general election candidates. 
16. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 3-120 (Supp. 1969); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 99.092 (Supp. 1971); 
HAWAII REV. LAWS§ 13-16 (1968); IDAHO CODE § 34-608 (Supp. 1971); MINN. STAT. ANN, 
§ 202.05 (1962); MISS. CODE ANN. § 3120 (Supp. 1971); NEB. REV, STAT. § 32-504 (1968): 
Omo REV. CooE ANN. § 3513.I0 (Baldwin 1971); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 161 (Supp. 
1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2914 (1963); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-3-14 (1953); WASH, 
REV. CODE ANN. § 29.18.050 (1965); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-5·8 (1966); WYO. STAT, ANN, 
§ 22-118.16 (Supp. 1971). 
17. ALA. CODE tit. 17, § 347 (1958); ALASKA STAT, § 15.25.050 (1971); CAL, ELECTIONS 
CODE § 6552 (West Supp. 1971); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-400 (Supp. 1971); DEL, 
ConE ANN. tit. 15, § 3104 (Supp. 1970); GA. CooE ANN. § 34-1013 (1970); KAN, STAT, 
ANN. § 25-206 (Supp. 1970); KY. REV. STAT. § 119.250 (1962); LA. REV. ANN. § 18:314 
(West 1969); Mo. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 4A-6 (1971); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 6.1163 (Supp, 
1971); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 120.350 (Supp. 1971); MoNT. REV. CooES ANN. § 23·3304 
(Supp. 1971): NEv. REV. STAT. § 293.193 (1963); N.H. REV. STAT, ANN. § 56:14 (1970); 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-8-26 (1970); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-107 (Supp. 1971); ORE. REV, 
STAT. § 249.271 (1969); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-400.74 (Supp. 1970); TEX. ELECTION CODE 
art. 13.07 (Supp. 1971); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.1-198 (Supp. 1971). 
18. ALA. CooE tit. 17, § 347 (1958); DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 15, §§ 3104, 3107 (Supp. 
1970); MISS. CoDE ANN. § 3120 (Supp. 1971); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 120.350 (Supp. 1971); 
S.C. CoDE ANN. § 23-400.74 (Supp. 1970). 
19. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-109, -120 (Supp. 1969) (a fixed candidate fee is required 
of all candidates; in addition party candidates must pay a ballot fee set by the 
party); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 99.092 (Supp. 1971) (a fee of 3% of the annual salary of 
the office is to be paid to the state, and an assessment of 2% to the party); LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 18.310-.3ll (West 1969) ($100 is to be paid to the state for all candidates, 
and up to $500 to the party, ,depending on party assessments). 
20. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-400 (Supp. 1971) (secretary of state); 
KY. REv. STAT. § 119.250 (1962) (county clerk). · 
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states put the fees into the general operating fund,21 although in five 
states the fees are earmarked for payment of governmental election 
expenses.22 
Still a third way of distinguishing the various fee systems is by 
the amount of the fee. Thirteen states set the fee for major offices 
at a percentage of the salary;23 such fees vary from one fourth of one 
per cent24 to six per cent25 of the annual salary. In four states the 
fees are set by the political party within a dollar limit established 
by statute.26 The remaining states require a fixed fee, the amount 
paid varying with the office. The maximum fees in these states range 
from one27 to fifteen hundred dollars.28 
The final characteristic of a fee system relevant to constitutional 
analysis is its force as an absolute requirement for appearance on the 
ballot. At the present time the majority of states impose mandatory 
fees on all candidates in the election. Only seven states provide alter-
native methods of reaching the ballot that do not require payment 
of a fee.20 
The differences in the internal structure of fee systems might 
suggest that legal generalizations on the validity of fee systems would 
be misplaced. Indeed, a series of federal cases have held some of the 
above distinctions to be of constitutional import. Whether these 
holdings are consistent with constitutional theory is a question open 
to considerable doubt.30 
21. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2914 (1963); w. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-5-8 (1966). 
22. CAL. ELECTIONS CODE § 6556 (West Supp. 1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-107 
(Supp. 1971); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 161 (Supp. 1971); TEX. ELECTION CODE art. 
13.o7a (Supp. 1971); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.1-198 (Supp. 1971). 
23. CAL. ELECTIONS CODE § 6552 (West Supp. 1971); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-400 
(Supp. 1971): FLA. STAT. ANN. § 99.092 (Supp. 1971); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-206 (Supp. 
1970); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 23-3304 (Supp. 1971): NEB. REv. STAT. § 32-513 
(1968): N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-8-26 (1970); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-107 (Supp. 1971): Omo 
REv. STAT. ANN. § 3513.10 (Baldwin 1971): UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-3-14 (1953); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 24,1-198 (Supp. 1971); WASH, REV. CODE ANN. § 29.18.050 (1965); W. 
VA. CODE ANN. § 3-5-8 (1966). 
24. UTAH CoDE ANN. § 20-3-14 (1953). 
25. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-8-26 (1970). 
26, ALA. CODE tit. 17, § 347 (1958); DEL, CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 3104 (Supp. 1970); 
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18:311 (West 1969): S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-400.74 (Supp. 1970). 
27. KY. REV. STAT. § 119.250 (1962). 
28. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 161 (Supp. 1971). 
29. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-400_ (Supp. 1971) (petition): KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-206 
(Supp. 1970) (petition); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 6.1163 (Supp. 1971) (petition); N.H. fuv. 
STAT. ANN. § 56:11 (1971) (petition): OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 161 (Supp. 1971) 
(petition); ORE. REV. STAT, § 249.220 (1967) (petition): TEX. ELECTION CODE art. 13.07a 
(Supp. 1971) (petition and pauper's affidavit). 
30. See pt. IV. infra. 
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III. THE LEGAL HISTORY OF FILING FEES 
The first cases to challenge filing fees arose in state courts; they 
were based primarily on alleged violations of state constitutions.81 
Since few courts dealt with the same arguments, no discernible pat-
tern emerged from these cases.32 Of more importance have been the 
recent attacks on filing fees based on federal grounds. The first of 
these was Jenness v. Little,33 a declaratory judgment action that 
sought to invalidate an Atlanta city ordinance imposing a mandatory 
filing fee on all candidates in municipal elections.84 The court limited 
its consideration to the claims of a candidate for alderman who 
alleged that the ordinance violated her rights under the due process, 
freedom of assembly, and equal protection clauses of the Federal 
Constitution.35 Basing its decision on the poll tax cases,80 the court 
held that "to prohibit candidates from getting their names on the 
ballot solely because they cannot post a certain amount of money is 
illegal and unconstitutional."37 It refused, however, to hold the fees 
unconstitutional per se, stating that if "the candidate can get his 
31. For discussion of several of these state cases, see Annot., 89 A.L.R,2d 864 (1963). 
32. E.g., Kelso v. Cook, 184 Ind. 173, llO N.E. 98'1 (1916) (fee unconstitutional 
because not related to services rendered to the candidate by the state): State ex rel. 
Thompson v. Scott, 99 Minn. 145, 108 N.W. 828 (1906) (fee constitutional because 
the amount so low as to impose no hardship on any prospective candidate): State ex rel. 
Neu v. Waechter, 332 Mo. 574, 58 S.W .2d 971 {1933) {fee unconstitutional because of state 
constitutional provision for free elections); State ex rel, Riggle v. Brodigan, 37 Nev. 
492, 143 P. 238 (1913) (fee not unconstitutionally excessive because it was not as 
much as campaign expenditures); Johnson v. Grand Forks County, 16 N.D. 363, 113 
N.W. 1071 (1907) (fee unconstitutional because it forced voters to pay a fee to enter 
a candidate of their choice); Ledgerwood v. Pitts, 122 Tenn. 570, 125 S.W. 1036 
(1909) (fee unconstitutional as creating an arbitrary and oppressive classification), 
33. 306 F. Supp. 925 (N.D. Ga. 1969), appeal dismissed sub nom. Matthews v. 
Little, 397 U.S. 94 (1970), discussed in Case Comment, 18 J. Pun. L. 483 (1969). 
34. The fee schedule was as follows: for mayor, $1000; for vice mayor, $600; for 
alderman, $500; for school board member, $400. See 306 F. Supp. at 927. 
35. The suit was originally brought by Linda Jenness, a candidate for mayor, 
to void a fee schedule enacted pursuant to a state statute (No. 229, § 3, [1969] Ga. 
Laws 2522) amending the city charter to allow such fees. The candidate for alderman, 
Ethel Mae Matthews, and a black voter and resident of Atlanta, Julie Shields, 
intervened as co-plaintiffs alleging that the ordinance was unconstitutional and 
violated § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1970}, The court 
found for the plaintiffs on the statutory ground and voided the ordinance. The city 
then enacted the ordinance involved in this case. Jenness did not press her claims 
against the new ordinance, but Matthews and Shields amended their complaints to 
challenge it. The court did not deal with the claims of the voter, Shields, stating 
that its holding on the rights of the candidate, Matthews, was substantially determina• 
tive of all of the issues in the case. 306 F. Supp. at 927. The court also dealt with 
the allegations under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, finding them baseless. 
306 F. Supp. at 928. 
36. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
37. 306 F. Supp. at 929. The court's holding applied only to future elections 
since it was felt that enjoining the fee for the current election would leave the city 
with no way to regulate the ballot. 306 F. Supp. at 929. 
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name on the ballot in some other fashion, either by nominating 
petition, primary, or pauper's affidavit,''38 the city ,vould he per-
mitted to continue the fees. 
From the Jenness decision, it seemed clear that fees would be 
struck down unless an alternative method of getting on the ballot 
was provided. But this seemingly clear conclusion was severely 
qualified in the next case dealing with filing fees, Wetherington v. 
Adams.39 The plaintiff, a candidate for the state legislature, sought 
to void a Florida statute imposing a mandatory filing fee on all 
those seeking a party nomination through a primary election.40 The 
plaintiff contended that fees were an unconstitutional denial of his 
rights to due process and equal protection.41 In disposing of the 
due process claim the court cited Snowden v. Hughes42 for the 
proposition that " 'an unlawful denial by state action of a right to 
state political office is not a denial of a right of property or of lib-
erty secured by the due process clause.' "43 The equal protection ar-
gument, the court held, was to be resolved according to the Supreme 
Court's formulation in Williams v. Rhodes:44 
"In determining whether or not a state law violates the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, we must consider the facts and circumstances behind 
the law, the interests which the State claims to be protecting, and 
interests of those who are disadvantaged by the classification."45 
Using this formulation, the Wetherington court found that the filing 
fees were justified by the state's interests in keeping elections to a 
manageable size, in limiting the ballot to only serious candidates, 
and in strengthening the political parties.46 These interests were 
clearly predominant since whatever disadvantage the fees caused a 
candidate were largely offset by a statute allowing the voter to write 
in the name of any candidate not on the ballot.47 Jenness was noted 
and distinguished with the statement that 
38. 306 F. Supp. at 929. 
39. 309 F. Supp. 318 (N.D. Fla. 1970). 
40. The fee was 5% of the annual salary, with 2% going to the party and 3% 
going to the state. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 99.092 (Supp. 1971). 
41. Plaintiff also contended that, if not unconstitutional per se, then the particular 
fees applying to him were unconstitutional as excessive. This contention was not, 
however, pressed in oral argument and the court treated it only in passing. 309 F. 
Supp. at 320. 
42. 321 U.S. l (1943). For further discussion of Snowden, see pt. IV. B. infra. 
43. 309 F. Supp. 318, 320 (N.D. Fla. 1970), quoting Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 
1, 7 (1943). 
44. 393 U.S. 23 (1968). For further discussion of Williams, see text accompanying 
notes 103-05 infra. 
45. 309 F. Supp. at 321, quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968). 
46. 309 F. Supp. at 321. 
47. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.011 (2) (Supp. 1971). 
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[t]here are factual differences between this case, and that one, which 
may be ground for differentiation between them. Be that as it may, 
this Court holds the prohibition here involved against candidates 
who do not pay the fees in question having their names on the ballot 
is legal and constitutional.4B 
The Wetherington court's handling of Jenness did little to clarify 
the apparent inconsistencies between the holdings. Thus, when the 
Jenness court was presented with another filing fee case in Georgia 
Socialist Workers Party v. Fortson,40 it felt constrained to reconcile 
the decisions. Fortson involved an attack on another Georgia statute, 
which imposed on all general election candidates a filing fee equal 
to five per cent of the annual salary of the office. 50 The court did not 
specifically deal with any of the claims advanced by the plaintiffs,51 
but instead simply stated that Jenness was controlling. The main 
portion of the opinion attempted to reconcile Jenness and Wether-
ington. The distinction was that the former dealt with independent 
candidates in general elections while the latter dealt with regular 
party candidates in primary elections.52 Yet the court did not appear 
totally satisfied with this distinction. It criticized the argument in 
Wetherington that serious candidates can raise the fee through cam-
paign funding, stating: 
[W]hile as the Wetherington court says, it may be true that serious 
candidates traditionally attract money for their candidacy, we cannot 
say as a matter of law that one's candidacy is not serious or that he 
does not have the right to run merely because he does not have or has 
thus far failed to attract a certain amount of money.53 
This caveat suggested that the views of the two courts were not 
completely reconcilable, a suggestion that was strengthened by an-
other three-judge panel sitting in Fowler v. Adams.54 In this case, a 
48. 309 F. Supp. at 322. 
49. 315 F. Supp. 1035 (N.D. Ga. 1970), afjd. on other grounds sub nom. Jenness v, 
Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971). 
50. No. 1079, § 34-1013, [1970] Ga. Laws 366-68. The suit also involved the 
constitutionality of GA. ConE ANN. § 34-1001 (Supp. 1970), which sets petition 
requirements for candidates other than those nominated by the major political parties. 
The statute requires minor party and independent candidates to submit petitions 
signed by 5% of the eligible voters to get on the general election ballot, Major 
party candidates do not have to submit petitions. The court upheld these require• 
ments, and the Supreme Court affirmed, 403 U.S. 431 (1971). Inasmuch as the filing 
fee requirements were not considered by the Court on appeal, it will be necessary 
to deal with only the lower court's holding on that issue. 
51. The plaintiffs, voters and candidates for governor and Congress, had alleged 
violations of equal protection and first amendment rights to vote, run for office, 
and petition for grievance. 315 F. Supp. at 1037. 
52. 315 F. Supp. at 1041. 
53. 315 F. Supp. at 1041. 
54. 315 F. Supp. 592 (M.D. Fla.), injunction granted, 400 U.S. 1205 (1970), appeal 
dismissed, 400 U.S. 986 (1971). The appeal was initially handled by Justice Black as 
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candidate for the Republican nomination for a seat· in· the United 
States House of Representatives sought to void the same Florida 
statute that had been upheld in Wetherington.56 He argued that the 
statute, in addition to violating equal protection, added require-
ments66 for congressional candidates other than those found in article 
I, section 2, clause 2, of the Constitution. 67 Dealing first with the 
article I argument, the court denied plaintiff's claim on the ground 
that such fees were merely an exercise of the state's power to regulate 
the manner of holding elections set forth in article I, section 4, 
clause 1 of the Constitution.58 As for the equal protection argument, 
the court cited as controlling the Wetherington holding that the 
state's interest in imposing the fees outweighed any harm to the 
candidate. 69 The contrary decisions were distinguished on tangen-
tial issues rather than on their merits. Jenness, for example, was 
distinguished on the ground that the case had later been found 
Circuit Justice, who stated that "[t]he case raises questions which make it impossible 
for me to predict with certainty what the majority of this Court would decide." 
400 U.S. at 1206. In view of his uncertainty on the merits, Justice Black ordered 
Fowler's name placed on the ballot on the equitable ground that, while this order 
caused the state little injury, a failure to do so would irreparably damage Fowler. 
It is unclear what issues in particular troubled Justice Black since the case 
involved both article I and equal protection claims. In his opinion he spent more 
time with the former but noted the discrepancy between this case and Fortson. 
55. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 99-092 (Supp. 1971). 
56. The "added qualifications" argument has often been made in state courts. 
Although not dealing with filing fees as a qualification, several of the state courts 
have held other restrictions unconstitutional as adding to the qualifications in the 
federal constitution. See, e.g., Danielson v. Fitzsimmons, 232 Minn. 149, 44 N.W.2d 
484 (1950) (conviction of a felony); Shub v. Simpson, 80 N.J.L. 193, 76 A.2d 332 
(1950) (requirement that candidate file affidavit that he is not a subversive person); 
State ex rel. Chavez v. Evans, 79 N.M. 578, 446 P.2d 445 (1968) (requirement that 
candidate be a resident and qualified elector of district from which he is running); 
State ex rel. Sundfor v. Thorson, 72 N.D. 246, 6 N.W.2d 89 (1942) (prohibition of 
defeated primary candidate from running in general election); Ekwall v. Stadelman, 
146 Ore. 439, 30 P.2d 1037 (1934) (prior oath by judge that he would accept no other 
nonjudicial office during his term); State v. Crane, 65 Wyo. 189, 197 P.2d 864 (1948) 
(state constitutional provision that governor not eligible for any other elective office 
during his term). Contra, Holley v. Adams, 238 S.2d 401 (Fla. 1970) (statute providing 
that current officeholders may not run for other concurrent offices acceptable since 
the candidate may give up his current office); Secretary of State v. McGucken, 244 
Md. 70, 222 A.2d 693 (1966) (requirement that candidate appoint a campaign 
treasurer). Federal courts have not dealt with this argument, although it seems 
likely that they will view the provisions as restrictively as state courts. Cf. Powell 
v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966). 
57. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2, states: "No person shall be a Representative who 
shall not have attained to the Age of twenty-five years, and been seven Years a 
Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of 
the State in which he shall be chosen." 
58. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1, provides: "The Times, Places and Manner of 
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State 
by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter 
such Regulations, except as to the Places of choosing Senators." · · 
59. 315 F. Supp. at 593-94. See text accompanying note 46 supra. 
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moot on appeal to the Supreme Court.60 Fortson was held inapplica-
ble since that court had specifically distinguished Wetherington, a 
case which the present court found controlling. The shallowness of 
this reasoning was apparent even to the court, however, since it felt 
constrained to follow the Fortson court's example and disagree with 
the supposedly distinguished decisions. Thus, the Fowler court stated: 
Nor may ... [plaintiff] ... rely on Harper v. Virginia State Board 
of Elections .... Permitting candidates to qualify in unlimited num-
ber simply upon meeting age, residence and citizenship requirements 
is calculated by sheer unwieldly weight of numbers of names to lead 
to a breakdown of the election process and destroy the free right of 
suffrage which Harper champions. At least, there is some guarantee 
of serious intentions when a candidate or his supporters pay a 
qualifying fee. We think Harper may not be so applied, despite the 
contrary views of the Jenness court.61 
Although Fowler and Fortson accepted the primary-general election 
distinction, both courts appeared to recognize that in reality it was 
merely a method of superficially reconciling fundamentally conflict-
ing cases. Furthermore, neither opinion offered any precedent or 
policy support for the distinction. This gap in analysis was quite evi-
dent in Thomas v. Mims,62 the next case to deal with the filing fee 
issue. 
In Thomas a candidate for the Mobile Board of Commissioners 
sought to invalidate an Alabama statute that imposed a mandatory 
filing fee on all those running in the municipal general election.03 
The plaintiff contended that the statute denied her rights to vote 
and to seek office in violation of due process and equal protection. 
The court disposed of her due process claim by citing the Snowden°4 
holding that the right to state office was a state created, not a federally 
created, right. In dealing with the equal protection argument, the 
court said: "The state must demonstrate not merely a reasonable 
justification for the distinction it draws between its citizens, it must 
show a compelling state interest."65 The court then examined the 
asserted state interests in defraying the costs of the election, in en-
suring that only serious candidates are on the ballot, and in control-
60. Matthews v. Little, 397 U.S. 94 (1970). It is not clear how the Fowler court 
concluded that the Supreme Court's decision invalidated the lower court decision in 
Jenness. The Matthews decision merely stated that, since the election had taken place 
between Jenness and the appeal, the case was moot. 397 U.S. at 94. The merits of 
the case were not discussed, so it appears that the decision of the lower court was 
left intact. 
61. 315 F. Supp. at 596 (emphasis original). 
62. 317 F. Supp. 179 (S.D. Ala. 1970). 
63. No. 287, § 3, [1965 Spec. SC§S] Ala. Laws 395. 
64. 321 U.S. 1 (1943), discussed in pt. IV. B. infra. 
65. 317 F. Supp. at 181 (emphasis original). 
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ling ballot size. Although these interests were essentially the same 
as those accepted to justify the fees in Wetherington,66 the Thomas 
court struck down the fees. 67 Yet, in the face of what appeared to be 
a fundamental inconsistency on this common issue and without offer-
ing any support for the distinction, the Thomas court concluded that 
Wetherington "is distinguishable because the fee involved there was 
for party primary elections. "68 
Although not logically consistent in many respects the five cases 
from Jenness through Thomas were at least unanimous in their 
agreement that filing fees are normally constitutional for primary 
elections, but are constitutional for general elections only if an 
alternative method of getting on the ballot is provided. But almost 
as quickly as this latter generalization emerged, it was qualified by 
the case of Carter v. Dies.69 
Under attack in Carter was a Texas statute that required candi-
dates to pay a flat fee of fifty dollars plus their pro rata share of the 
costs of the election in order to get on the primary ballot.70 The suit 
was initiated by various candidates for county office, but at trial the 
court allowed several voters to intervene as plaintiffs. As amended, 
the complaint alleged that the fees violated the due process and equal 
protection clauses by denying the plaintiffs and intervenors, respec-
tively, their rights to run for office and to vote for candidates of their 
choice. In its decision, however, the court dealt exclusively with the 
rights of the intervenor voters.71 The court found that the fees, by 
keeping poor candidates off the ballot, seriously impaired a citizen's 
ability to vote effectively.72 Because of this impairment, it was held 
that the fees could be justified under the equal protection clause only 
if they were necessary to the accomplishment of some compelling state 
interest. The court noted that the Texas fee system had previously 
been held to be a revenue generating mechanism.73 Relying on the 
66. See text accompanying note 46 supra. 
67. Thomas suggested, as had Jenness, that a filing fee might be permissible 
if it were a part of a system that allowed a candidate to " 'get his name on the ballot 
in some other fashion, either by nominating petition, primary election, or pauper's 
affidavit.'" 317 F. Supp. at 182, quoting Jenness v. Little, 306 F. Supp. 925, 929 (N.D. 
Ga. 1969), appeal dismissed sub nom. Matthews v. Little, 397 U.S. 94 (1970). 
68. 317 F. Supp. at 182. 
69. 321 F. Supp. 1358 (N.D. Tex. 1970), affd. sub nom. Bullock v. Carter, 40 
U.S.L.W. 4211 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1972). 
70. Ch. 492, § 186, [1951] Tex. Laws 1168-69 (now TEX. ELECTION ConE art. 13.07 
(Supp. 1971)). The assessment of costs often involved substantial sums. For example, 
the costs assessed against plaintiff candidate for county judge amounted to $6300. 
321 F. Supp. at 1360. 
71. "Since the rights of the intervenors as voters will be determinative of the 
constitutionality of the laws here attacked, we deem it unnecessary to discuss the 
rights of the candidates." 321 F. Supp. at 1360. 
72. 321 F. Supp. at 1361. 
73. 321 F. Supp. at 1361, citing Campbell v. Davenport, 362 F.2d 624 (5th Cir. 
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poll tax cases, the court concluded that the state's interest in raising 
revenue was not sufficient to justify the infringement on the right to 
vote, and the filing fees were therefore declared unconstitutional.74 
The Carter court attempted to reconcile the prior federal cases 
involving filing fees. The effort instead resulted in yet another dem-
onstration of the basic inconsistencies among the various decisions. 
First, the court limited its holding by stating: 
The Court does not mean to imply that there is no compelling in-
terest, pursuant to which the State may require a primary filing fee. 
We have limited our decision here to say that a filing fee violates the 
First Amendment and the due process and equal protection clauses 
of the Fourteenth Amendment when it is used as a revenue collecting 
device or when made an absolute qualification in order for a can-
didate to get his name on the ballot. Indeed, there may be other com-
pelling interests which would justify some type of reasonable fee.76 
The court went on to distinguish Wetherington by saying: 
The plaintiff in that case was a candidate and the issues were decided 
on the basis of what were his rights vis-a-vis those of the state. While 
neither approving nor disapproving of the reasoning used or the 
results reached, we need only say that in the case at bar we have 
resolved the issues on the rights of the voters. The cases are, there-
. fore, distinguishable. 10 
It is not at all clear that the court was persuaded of its own logic. 
It may have simply been looking for a way to void fees in a primary 
election without directly contradicting Wetherington. Or it may have 
been reacting to an isolated situation presented by the Texas stat-
ute.77 
This latter interpretation was reinforced on appeal by a unani-
mous Supreme Court, which seized upon the "salient features" of 
1966). The question in Campbell was whether the costs assessed under the statute 
were regulatory or merely another form of state tax, the latter being deductible 
for federal income tax purposes. The Campbell court found the assessment to be a tax: 
The persuasive factor in reaching our conclusion is the size of the primary 
assessment in Texas. A fee of $100 or even $500 might be explainable primarily 
in terms of regulation. But it strains our imagination to accept the Commissioner's 
argument that an assessment of some $2000 is primarily for the purpose of 
regulation. The most reasonable explanation of the size of the assessment is to 
raise revenue to cover the cost of the primary. 
362 F.2d at 629. Contra, McLean v. Durham County Bd. of Elections, 222 N.C. 6, 
21 S.E.2d 842 (1942). 
74. 321 F. Supp. at 1362-63. 
75. 321 F. Supp. at 1362. 
76. 321 F. Supp. at 1362-63. 
77. This explanation is supported by Judge Thornberry's concurring opinion in 
Carter. 321 F. Supp. at 1363. He pointed out that the fees were several times higher 
than those dealt with by other courts and thus posed a proportionately greater 
disadvantage to poor candidates. 
January 1972] Notes 569 
the Texas system in affirming the district court.78 Following the 
lead of the lower court, the Supreme Court placed its emphasis 
upon the fees as restrictions on the voters' rights: 
Unlike a filing fee requirement which most candidates could be ex-
pected to fulfill from their own resources or at least through moder-
ate contributions, the very size of the fees imposed under the Texas 
system gives it a patently exclusionary character .... To the extent 
that the system requires candidates to rely on contributions from 
voters in order to pay the assessments, a phenomenon which can 
hardly be rare in light of the size of the fees, it tends to deny some 
voters the opportunity to vote for a candidate of their cl1oosing .... 79 
In light of the harm caused the voters, the Court concluded that a 
strict scrutiny of the fees and the state interests offered to justify 
them would be required. 
Under this standard the Court could not deem the fees neces-
sary to the regulation of the ballot or to the production of revenue-
interests which the Court nonetheless acknowledged as legitimate.80 
Once again it was the excessive character of the fees that concerned 
the Court: such fees did not effectively promote the goal of limit-
ing the ballot to serious candidates since legitimate candidates might 
well be unable to meet the assessment. Similarly, the Court was 
unwilling to accept the proposition that filing fees were necessary 
to the financing scheme of primary elections. On the basis of this 
analysis the Supreme Court concluded that the Texas fee system 
violated the equal protection clause, although its holding was 
couched in more guarded terms than that of the district court. 
·whereas the lower court decision maintained that filing fees would 
be unconstitutional when used as a revenue measure or when made 
an absolute requirement with no alternative means of access to the 
ballot, the Supreme Court simply noted that the Texas scheme suf-
fered from both flaws. More importantly, the Court cautioned that 
its decision was not intended to reflect upon the validity of reason-
able filing fees. 81 
Because of its limitations, Carter leaves many questions unre-
solved. Jenness, Fortson, and Thomas had taken the position that 
filing fees were unconstitutional unless a reasonable alternative was 
provided.82 In light of Carter, will a fee that is excessive in amount 
be invalid despite the availability of an alternative route to the bal-
lot? Conversely, will a fee that is reasonable in amount be valid 
78. Bullock v. Carter, 40 U.S.L.W. 4211 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1972), afjg. Carter v. Dies, 321 
F. Supp. 1358 (N.D. Tex. 1970). 
79. 40 U.S.L.W. at 4214. 
80. 40 U.S.L.W. at 4214, 4216. 
81. 40 U.S.L.W. at 4216. 
82. See also Socialist Workers Party v. Welch, 334 F. Supp. 179 (S.D. Tex. 1971). 
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despite the ·lack of an alternative, as apparently was suggested in 
TVelh_{:_:,:ington and Fowler?83 Or will a fee only be struck down when 
it is unreasonable in amount and when no alternative access is avail-
able? But perhaps the most important question left unresolved by 
Carter is whether ariy fee system regardless of its provisions should 
be valid. Underlying the latter question is the fundamental conflict 
between the Progressive legacy of ballot restriction and the present 
demand for increased access to the ballot. A resolution of this conflict 
can no longer be avoided. 
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
Three claims recurred frequently in the filing fee cases: excessive-
ness of the fee, lack of due process, and violation of equal protection. 
The first two were not extensively discussed by most of the courts; 
it was the third claim that occupied the attention of the courts and 
served as the basis for the most significant differences of opinion. 
Much of this section will therefore be devoted to the equal protection 
argument in an attempt to resolve the inconsistencies that have arisen 
in the recent cases. 
Because there is considerable variation among the filing fee sys-
tems in various states, a survey that sought to analyze these distinctions 
in every context would be needlessly confusing. In the discussion 
that follows, the focus of analysis will instead be on a hypothetical or 
model fee system. The significance of the variations from this model 
will be postponed until this analysis is complete. In this model the 
term "filing fee" will be used to describe a mandatory system of fees 
for all general election candidates. It will be assumed that the amount 
of the fee is three per cent of the annual salary for the office. The 
fees, under this model, will be paid to a state official and deposited in 
the general operating fund. This hypothetical system, it should be 
noted, is simply a combination of the most widely adopted character-
istics of present fee systems. It should therefore provide the most con-
venient method for the general analysis of the constitutionality of the 
fees. 
83. See also Spillers v. Slaughter, 325 F. Supp. 550 (M.D. Fla. 1971). Spillers involved 
another attack on the Florida statute upheld in Wetherington. Unlike other cases, 
however, the plaintiffs included both prospective candidates and voters. Their com-
plaint offered a new argument in opposition to filing fees. In addition to a violation 
of equal protection, the plaintiffs alleged that fees denied their rights in "voting and 
running for office [which] are expressions of free speech and association, and constitute 
privileges and immunities which are secured by the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the Constitution." 325 F. Supp. at 551. Neither the additional parties nor claims 
were sufficient to induce the court to change the stance previously adopted. The court 
summarily concluded that the privileges and immunities argument was covered by the 
Snowden theory of state-created rights. See pt. JV. B. infra. As for the equal protection 
argument, the court indicated the state interests recognized in Wetherington were 
sufficient to outweigh any disadvantage to either voters or candidates. See 325 F. Supp. 
at .552-53. The distrid .court decision in Carter and the poll tax cases were distin-
guished as applying only to fees imposed to raise revenue, 825 F. Supp. at 553.54, 
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A.· Excessiveness 
The argument that a filing fee is excessive is simply an ·argument 
that the fee does not meet the court's standard for reasonableness. 
Most of the plaintiffs pressed the argument as a backstop in the event 
that they lost their argument that the fees were unconstitutional per 
se.B4 The argument initially met with little success. The only case in 
which the argument was accepted was Carter, which dealt with the 
exceptionally high Texas assessments.B5 In the other cases the courts 
were simply unwilling to hold that, as a matter of law, the amount of 
the fees they were considering was excessive.B6 
The problem lies not in the argument but rather in the reluctance 
of the courts to be involved in setting precise doll~r limits on reason-
ableness. Indeed, though the fees examined in the federal cases were 
all much higher than the three per cent figure used in the model, 
only the Supreme Court in Carter was willing to find the fee exces-
sive. Thus, although the argument may have theoretical validity, in 
practice it may be quite difficult to convince a court that any fee is 
excessive. 
B. Due Process 
In the filing fee cases the plaintiffs, whether candidates or voters, 
almost uniformly asserted that the fees denied them a right secured 
by the privileges and immunities or due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. The courts were equally uniform in their re-
sponse, relying on SnowdenB1 to dispose of the claim.BB Snowden in-
volved allegations that the Canvassing Board of Cook County had 
failed to place the plaintiff's name on the general election ballot even 
though he had been duly nominated in the Republican primary. Be-
cause of the proportional representation plan then in effect in Illi-
nois, an agreement between the parties had already assured the plain-
tiff the election. so The plaintiff therefore alleged that the action of the 
84. For example, in Carter it was claimed that even if there were state interests 
compelling enough to justify a fee, the particular fee involved was "exorbitant, arbi-
trary, capricious, irrelevant, unreasonable, outrageously high • • • [and] without any 
reasonable relation to any legitimate legislative purpose." 321 F. Supp. at 1360. 
85. See note 70 supra. 
86. State courts that have considered this problem have seldom voided filing 
fees as excessive. Several courts have, however, used the somewhat related standard 
of arbitrariness to void them. These courts have held that the fee was not related 
to any legislative purpose. It should be noted that few of these courts considered 
ballot regulation as a permissible state objective. See Kelso v. Cook, 184 Ind. 173, 
110 N.E. 987 (1916); State ex rel. Boomer v. Nichols, 50 Wash. 529, 97 P. 733 (1908); 
People ex rel. Breackon v. Board of Election Commrs., 221 Ill. 9, 77 N.E. 321 (1906). 
87. 321 U.S. 1 (1943). 
88. See Spillers v. Slaughter, 325 F. Supp. 550, 552 (M.D. Fla. 1971); Thomas v. 
Mims, 317 F. Supp. 179, 181 (N.D. Ala. 1970); Fowler v. Adams, 315 F. Supp. 592, 
595 (N.D. Fla. 1970); Wetherington v. Adams, 309 F. Supp. 818, 320 (N.D. Fla. 1970). 
89. The parties had agreed that two Republicans and one Democrat would be 
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Board deprived him of his state office without due process. The Court 
concluded that the right to state office was not protected by due pro-
cess or the privileges and immunities clause since this right was an 
incident of state rather than federal citizenship.00 The Court then 
affirmed the judgment against the plaintiff on the ground that the 
complaint failed to state a cause of action since "the right asserted by 
the petitioner is not one secured by the Fourteenth Amendment."01 
Although Snowden has not been recently tested, it is apparently still 
considered valid by the Court. 02 
Snowden is not, however, dispositive of all due process claims. A 
different characterization of due process problems was accepted by 
the court in Briscoe v. Kusper.03 In that case twelve independent can-
didates for alderman alleged that the Chicago Board of Elections sus-
tained objections to their nominating petitions without giving the 
candidates an adequate chance to answer the charges. The court held 
that their claims under the due process clause were sufficient to state 
a cause of action: 
[I]n this instance, we perceive the complaint of these candidates and 
voters as transcending mere assertion of state created rights. The 
thrust of their challenge .•. rests upon the effect which denial of 
ballot placement has upon their enjoyment of rights of free association 
and petition for the redress of grievances. For this reason, and be-
cause of the developments in the body of constitutional law dealing 
with "political rights," we also conclude that Snowden v. Hughes 
does not preempt consideration of plaintiffs' constitutional due pro-
cess claims. 04 
The only court presented with this due process-rights of associa-
tion argument in the filing fee context was Spillers v. Slaughter0u and 
it disposed of the argument by relying on Snowden. This holding in 
Spillers is obviously at odds with Briscoe and therefore is open to seri-
ous doubt. A legitimate argument might well be made on the associa-
nominated for the three seats in the district. Plaintiff had received the second highest 
number of votes in the Republican primary. 321 U.S. at 3-5. 
90. 321 U.S. at 6-7. 
91. 321 U.S. at 13. 
92. Cf. Bullock v. Carter, 40 U.S.L.W. 4211, 4214 n. 19 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1972); Egan v. 
City of Aurora, 365 U.S. 514, 515 (1961). 
93. 435 F.2d 1046 (7th Cir. 1970). 
94. 435 F.2d at 1053. The Briscoe court justified this approach by reference to a 
statement made by the Court in a per curiam opinion, Egan v. City of Aurora, 365 
U.S. 514, 514-15 (1961): "Insofar as any right claimed stems from petitioner's status 
as mayor under Illinois law it is precluded from assertion here by Snowden v. 
Hughes •••. But as we read the complaint, the rights which petitioner claims he 
was deprived of are those that derive from the Fourteenth Amendment, particularly 
the right of free speech and assembly." 
95. 325 F. Supp. 550 (M.D. Fla. 1971), discussed in note 83 supra. 
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tion and petition issues, circumventing the Snowden decision.96 It 
should be recognized, however, that due process claims have not been 
eagerly accepted by the courts. While it may be that the concept is be-
ginning to breathe new life, 97 it is nonetheless clear that under the cur-
rent constitutional doctrine equal protection arguments are a more 
readily accepted form of attack. More importantly, the equal protec-
tion rubric provides a means of resolving the real conflict between elec-
toral simplicity and ballot access. 
C. Equal Protection 
If the courts have been unstinting in their determination to rec-
oncile inconsistent positions on the filing fees, it may be more a func-
tion of a basic disagreement on the meaning of equal protection than 
of intellectual deceit. Justice Harlan, in his dissent in Shapiro v. 
Thompson,98 carefully delineated the standards to be applied to statu-
tory classifications alleged to be in violation of the equal protection 
clause. Under traditional doctrine a statute is found to violate equal 
protection only when it results in discrimination against a certain class 
of people and the classification is not rationally related99 to any legiti-
mate state policy. But the traditional standard gives way to a more 
exacting test under special circumstances. Thus "[s]tatutory classifica-
tions which either are based upon certain 'suspect' criteria or affect 
'fundamental rights' will be held to deny equal protection unless justi-
fied by a 'compelling' governmental interest."100 A stricter scrutiny 
and a higher level of justification may be triggered then by the scheme 
of classification or the interests involved. The Court has already con-
cluded that classification based on wealth must be deemed "sus-
pect."101 In the context of the poll tax cases the Court noted: 
"Wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane to one's ability to 
96. A further limitation on Snowden might also be noted. It applies only to state 
elections since it is based on the difference between federal and state citizenship. In 
a case involving a federal office, it should be possible to state a cause of action under 
due process without fear of a Snowden-type holding. But see Fowler v. Adams, 315 
F. Supp. 592, 595 (M.D. Fla. 1970). 
97. Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). 
98. 394 U.S. 618, 655 (1969). 
99. Justice Harlan described the extent of the relationship required as follows: 
A legislative measure will be found to deny equal protection only if "it is 
without any reasonable basis and is therefore purely arbitrary." • • • It is not 
enough that the measure results incidently "in some inequality," or that it 
is not drawn with "mathematical nicety" ••• ; the statutory classification must 
instead cause "different treatments ••• so disparate, relative to the difference in 
classification, as to be wholly arbitrary." 
394 U.S. at 662 (citations omitted). 
100. 394 U.S. at 658. 
101. See McDonald v. Board of Election Commrs., 394 U.S. 802 (1969); Harper v. Vir-
ginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). But 
cf, James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1970), in which the Court refused to overturn on 
equal protection grounds a California constitutional provision requiring all proposed low-
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participate intelligently in the electoral process."102 It would be hard 
to deny that the model filing fee system imposes a standard of wealth 
on candidates since it requires the candidate to meet an assessment 
in order to get on the ballot. It seems clear therefore that filing fees 
create a classification based on a "suspect" criterion and should be 
justified only by a countervailing and compelling state interest. 
The same conclusion is reached if filing fees are viewed with re-
spect to Harlan's second category, the impairment of a fundamental 
right. Its applicability is perhaps best demonstrated by Williams v. 
Rhodes,103 a case dealing with another restriction on candidates' ac-
cess to the ballot. The plaintiffs, two independent parties, challenged 
the validity of an Ohio statute that set up a petition procedure to be 
followed by small independent parties desiring to place candidates 
on the general ballot.104 In determining the proper equal protection 
standard to apply, the Court found: 
[T]he state laws place burdens on two different, although overlap• 
ping, kinds of rights-the right of political beliefs, and the right of 
qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their 
votes effectively. Both of these rights, of course, rank among our most 
precious freedoms. We have repeatedly held that freedom of associa-
tion is protected by the First Amendment ..•. Similarly we have said 
with reference to the right to vote: "No right is more precious in a 
free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who 
make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other 
rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is under-
mined • • . .''105 
income housing projects to be submitted to a community referendum. The Court did not 
apply the compelling interest test. It is unclear whether this case signals a retreat 
from previous doctrine. The Court did not specifically deal with the question of 
wealth as a suspect criterion; it may well be that the Court simply felt that no 
classification based on wealth was created. In any event, the Court's past holdings 
make it clear that such a classification is created when persons are unable to exercise 
a public right because of an inability to pay. Since that is the type of question raised 
by a filing fee, the Court would have to retreat much further than even a broad 
reading of Valtierra would suggest, 
102, Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966), 
103. 393 U.S. 23 (1968). 
104. No. 101, § 1, [1930] Ohio Laws 335 (now OHIO REv. CODE ANN.§ 3517,01 (Baldwin 
1971)). The statute applied to any small party that did not receive 10% of the votes 
cast in the preceding gubernatorial election. It required such parties to obtain 
petitions signed by qualified voters equal to 15% of the total number of votes 
cast in the preceding gubernatorial election in order to have their candidates listed 
on the ballot. 
105. 393 U.S. at 30-31 (1966) (footnotes omitted). The Court appears to be saying 
that the stricter scrutiny is triggered by what Justice Harlan would classify as the 
impairment of a fundamental right. In his dissent in Shapiro, however, Justice 
Harlarr analyzed Williams in slightly more complex terms: 
Analrsis is complicated when the statutory classification is grounded upon the 
-exercise of a "fundamental" right. For then the statute may come within the first 
b~3I!cl_l of _thi; "compellip.g inferest" d,oc.trine because exercise of the right Js 
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The Williams decision thus sets out two "fundamental" rights that 
may be violated by restricting candidate access to the ballot: the right 
to associate and the right to vote. The concern here, as it was with 
the "suspect" criterion standard, must be whether the model filing 
fee system sufficiently impairs these rights to call for use of the "com-
pelling interest" standard. · 
The right to "engage in association for the advancement of beliefs 
and ideas"106 is guaranteed against state action by the first and four-
teenth amendments.107 To impose a filing fee is to create an obstacle 
in the path of any party seeking to "advance" its "beliefs and ideas" 
through the political system. A fee, by restricting the ballot to those 
able to pay, would of necessity impair the right to associate since, as 
recognized in Williams, "[t]he right to form a party for the advance-
ment of political goals means little if a party can be kepf off the 
ballot and thus denied an equal opportunity to win votes."108 
A fee system also impairs the right to vote by making an individ-
ual's vote less effective. 'While it may be that there is some psycholog-
ical value in the mechanical act of voting, the courts have long recog-
nized that the right to vote is of political value only if the vote has 
an effect on the system. Thus in the reapportionment case of Rey-
nolds v. Sims,100 great emphasis was placed on ensuring that all voters 
had an approximately equal voice in choosing their representatives. 
As the Court in Carter pointed out,11° Reynolds was concerned with 
the quantitative effectiveness of the vote. The effort was to ensure that 
the extrinsic value of all votes was equal. Filing fees do not impinge 
on the quantitative effectiveness of the vote since all votes are given 
the same weight. They may, however, reduce the effectiveness of the 
vote in a qualitative sense. Just as a vote is effective only if it carries 
weight in the system, it is likewise effective only if it adequately re-
flects the individual's policy preferences. In other words, the system 
must strive to ensure that a citizen's vote is intrinsically valuable to 
him as an expression of his political choices.111 
deemed a "suspect" criterion and also within the second because the statute is 
considered to affect the right by deterring its exercise. Williams v. Rhodes ••• 
is such a case insofar as the statutes involved both inhibited exercise of the 
right of political association and drew distinctions based upon the way the right 
was exercised. · · · 
394 U.S. at 660-61 n.9. 
106. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1958). 
107. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
108. 393 U.S. at 31. 
109. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
110. 40 U.S.L.W. at 4214. 
111. The quality of the vote is in fact more than a matter of the intrinsic value 
to the individual; it holds forth the prospect of systemic effect. As recent campaigns 
have demonstrated, out of the mouth of the third-party or maverick. candidate may 
grow political power. · 
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The Williams Court recognized this fact when it remarked that 
"the right to vote is heavily burdened if that vote may be cast only 
for one of two parties at a time when other parties are clamoring for 
a place on the ballot."112 To rephrase this passage in the context of 
a filling fee, the right to vote is burdened if that vote may be cast only 
for candidates who can afford a filing fee at a time when poorer can-
didates are clamoring for a place on the ballot. Unless a person can 
find on the ballot a candidate who reflects to some extent his policy 
preferences, it cannot be said that he is voting effectively. Although 
this does not mean that every voter must find a candidate to his liking 
on the ballot, it certainly requires that every voter have an equal op-
portunity to place a candidate of his choice on the ballot. This goal 
is significantly impinged upon by fee systems such as our model. For 
such a system to be effective, it must eliminate some poorer candi-
dates who may reflect the attitudes of a significant portion of the 
population. Since the result is seriously to reduce the intrinsic value 
of a person's vote as well as to abridge the right of association, it 
is incumbent upon the state to demonstrate the compelling interest 
that it is championing under such a fee system.113 
In the federal cases on filing fees the courts recognized either im-
plicitly or explicitly that a stricter scrutiny had been triggered by the 
classifications and the rights involved. They did not, however, agree 
on the exact standard that the state must meet under the stricter scru-
tiny. The three courts that upheld the fees, Wetherington, Fowler, 
and Spillers, used a different standard from that used by the four 
courts that struck down such fees. In none of the cases in the former 
group was the "compelling interest" standard used. Instead ot the 
"compelling interest'' test, this group used a test based on a passage 
from Williams: "In determining whether or not a state law violates 
the Equal Protection Clause, we must consider the facts and cir-
cumstances behind the law, the interests which the State claims to be 
protecting, and interests of those who are disadvantaged by the classi-
fication."114 Relying on this passage, the three courts applied a tradi-
tional balancing test to determine which interests should prevail. 
But the "compelling state interest" test involves much more than 
ll2. 393 U.S. at 31. 
ll3. This analysis was accepted in essence by the Court in Carter. The Court was 
careful, however, to point out that the mere existence of a burden on the right to 
vote does not of itself trigger the higher standard; one must look to the extent and 
nature of the impact of the burden on the voter to determine whether strict scrutiny 
is required. 40 U.S.L.W. at 4214. While the 3% fee posited in the model is perhaps 
not as "patently exclusionary" as the Texas fee, it seems probable that it would be of 
such a magnitude as to be beyond the reach of the personal resources of many poor 
candidates. In any event, the distinction suggested by the Court between an inability 
to pay and an unwillingness to pay is a dubious one. See text accompanying notes 
123 &: 128-31 infra. 
ll4. 393 U.S. at 30. 
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a simple balancing of the equities. It initially requires that the end 
that the state seeks to attain be of "compelling" importance. This 
means more than a showing that the goal is a legitimate state concern; 
it demands that the state show "pressing public necessity"1115 for the 
achievement of the goal since "[ o ]nly the gravest abuses, endangering 
paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation."116 In 
addition, the test requires that the state action be "necessary, and 
not merely rationally related" to the accomplishment of that state 
interest.117 Each of the courts that struck down a filing fee scheme 
used this test. Moreover, the passage from the Supreme Court opinion 
in Williams that was used by the three courts upholding fee systems 
was taken out of context. The Williams court did not intend to say 
that a simple balancing test was all that was needed, but instead 
agreed with earlier cases by requiring that the state interest be "com-
pelling. "118 
It seems clear that the different tests used by the courts had a 
significant impact on the decisions. As a proper application of the 
compelling interest test will demonstrate, the putative state interests 
behind a filing fee cannot be deemed to outweigh the harm caused 
to the voter and candidate. 
a. Harm to the individual. Harm to the voter is difficult to mea-
sure. No adequate empirical measure exists to gauge the harm caused 
by the failure of a voter to find his candidate on the ballot. The 
Carter Court has nevertheless indicated that it is the harm to the 
voter that provides the axis of analysis in the case of filing fees-al-
though this constitutional harm is in fact a function of the harm 
done to the would-be candidate. Ultimately then it is the effect of the 
fees upon the candidate that must be assessed. Harm to the individ-
ual candidate can be examined from two perspectives. The first is 
empirical. One can look to the available data on candidate financing 
to establish whether the imposition of filing fees would truly disad-
vantage any candidates. The primary source of these data is informa-
tion on the campaign expenditures of candidates for various offices. 
From the available information on this subject, it appears that a three 
per cent fee used in the model would constitute a very small percent-
age of the total campaign expenditures of most serious candidates. It 
was estimated that the cost of running an effective campaign in 1970 
would be $100,000 for the House of Representatives and $250,000 
115. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
116. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1944). 
117. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 186 (1964). See also Bullock v. Carter, 40 
U.S.L.W. 4211 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1972), afjg. Carter v. Dies, 321 F. Supp. 1358 (N.D. Tex. 
1970). 
118. In determining whether the State has power to place such unequal burdens 
on minority groups where rights of this kind are at stake, the decisions of this 
Court have consistently held that "only a compelling state interest in the 
578 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 70:558 
for the Senafe.119 These estimates may in fact be somewhat low. Some 
primary. campaign expenditures for races in major states were re-
portedly in excess of $1,000,000.120 Obviously these expenses are ex-
ceptional, but even in smaller states the campaign expenses for a 
major office are not insignificant.121 Moreover, although the data are 
not nearly as complete, it appears that a fee such as proposed by the 
model would not be a very large part of campaign expenditures for 
minor offices.122 One can safely conclude that such fees would be 
rather inconsequential to the majority of those who seriously con-
template running for office. 
Yet harm may, as stated above, be viewed from two perspectives. 
While it may be true that from an empirical perspective filing fees 
do not hinder the majority of candidates, it does not necessarily fol-
low that the harm is insignificant from a constitutional perspective. 
The validity of state action is not to be measured simply by the 
usual impact on the average man but must also take into account the 
impact on particular groups or individuals who are specially affected 
by the state's act. When viewed from this perspective, there can be 
little doubt that at least some indigent candidates are affected by 
filing fee systems. One need only look to the plaintiffs in the fee cases 
to find examples of individuals allegedly disadvantaged by such 
schemes. There is, however, the troubling suggestion in Carter that 
the Court may draw a distinction between the effect of a filing fee 
upon those individuals who are unable to pay and those who are un-
willing to pay. The distinction appears to rest on the premise that 
an unwillingness to pay a fee reflects upon the candidate's seriousness, 
a premise that is untenable for constitutional purposes.123 A fee need 
not completely obstruct a candidate; it is sufficient that it simply 
create a disincentive to political candidacy.124 Either result would 
produce constitutionally cognizable harm to the candidate and voter. 
b. The state interests. The Progressive concern for voting ration-
regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power to regulate can 
justif} limiting First Amendment freedoms." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 
438 (1963). 
393 U.S. at 31. 
ll9. TWENTIEl'H CENTURY FUND, ELECTING CONGRESS! THE FINANCIAL DILEllll\fA 
8 (1970). 
120. 28 CONG, Q. WEEKLY REP. 1672 (1970). 
121. See Wall St. J., Sept 28, 1970, at I, col. 1. 
• 122. Perhaps the best collection of studies in .this field is 2 CmZENS RESEARCH 
FOUNDATION, STUDIES IN MONEY IN POLITICS (H. Alexander ed. 1970), Although these 
studies are based on 1964-1966 elections, they support the general conclusion that a 
3% filing fee . would not be a significant percentage of most candidates' election 
expenses. 
·· 123. See text accompanying notes 128-31 infra. 
124. The effect of a fee would be most strongly felt on the level of local elective 
offices. Even a relatively modest fee might dissuade an othenvise serious candidate 
from ,seeking office, particularly if qther political factors already weigh against him, 
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ality, as reflected in the fees, focused on the interests of the majority 
rather than of the individual. That is, the Progressives believed that 
the interests of the majority should be preserved by an electoral sys-
tem that was understandable by and responsive to the citizenry. If this 
meant that certain groups or individuals were denied access, the Pro-
gressives felt justified in that they were merely protecting the demo-
cratic idea of majority rule. 
Viewed from this vantage point, the equal protection issue turns 
on whether the state's and therefore the majority's interests are to 
be given precedence over those of the individual. Three state inter-
ests have been advanced to justify the imposition of filing fees: (1)-
to raise revenue to defray the costs of staging the election; (2) to limit 
the ballot to serious candidates; and (3) to control ballot size. 
The argument early raised in defense of filing fees was that of 
revenue production. Analogizing the fee to user taxes,125 the state 
claimed that it was only proper that the candidates pay part of the 
cost of the election that was staged for their benefit. Some early state 
court cases adopted this argument.126 Under the "compelling inter-
est" test, however, the argument is quite inadequate. The reason was 
well stated by the lower court in Carter: "The collection of revenue 
is, of course, a permissible and legitimate interest but under these 
circumstances not a compelling state interest. These assessments are 
not necessary to insure the collection of revenue."127 
A second state interest that the fees allegedly serve is that of lim-
iting the ballot to serious candidates. The underlying premise of this 
argument is that a "serious candidate for public office has tradition-
ally attracted money for his candidacy. The inability to pay a reason-
able filing fee might indicate lack of potential political support for 
a person's candidacy."128 The empirical data available appear to sup-
port this conclusion. One of the leading authorities on the subject 
of campaign financing has written: 
The necessity for obtaining essential election funds has its most 
profound importance in the choosing of candidates. The monies can 
usually be assured, and often can be withheld, by a relatively small 
corps of political specialists whose job it is to raise money. If the 
125. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 1742 (1970), which provides that the proceeds of federal 
taxes on avialion fuel and air transportation shall be used solely for the improvement 
of the nation's airways. 
126. See Munsel v. Hennegan, 182 Md. 15, 31 A.2d 640 (1943): Riter v. Douglas, 
32 Nev. 400, 109 P. 444 (1910). The strength of this argument is shown hy the fact 
that some courts struck down fees lhal lhey fell were not directed loward raising 
revenue. Cf. Kelso v. Cook, 184 Ind. 173, 110 N.E. 987 (1916); Johnson v. Grand Forks 
Counly, 16 N.D. 363, 113 N.\V. 1071 (1907). 
127. 321 F. Supp. at 1361. On appeal, the Supn·me Court sprcilically rejected lhe 
argument lhat lhe candidales should "pay lhal share of lhe cost \\hi<.11 lhey have 
occasioned." 40 U.S.L.W. al 4215. 
1_28. W~therington v. Adams, _309 F. SUPP.· 318, ~2!_ (N.D •. Fla. l!l}O)~ 
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prospective candidate cannot get assurances of the support necessary 
to meet the basic costs of a campaign, he may as well abandon hope 
of winning.129 
But this argument, like the revenue argument before it, misses the 
mark. It is an attempt to equate success with seriousness, a connec-
tion which, at least in constitutional thought, is erroneous. The Court 
has consistently held that a man's sincerity cannot be measured by 
his material possessions.130 The conclusion is inescapable: Although 
a state may indeed have an interest in ensuring that only serious 
candidates get on the ballot, filing fees are neither necessary nor 
rationally related to the furtherance of that state interest.131 
The final argument advanced to justify the fees presents perhaps 
the clearest example of the clash between the value of access and the 
Progressive drive for restriction. It is the problem of ballot control, 
which formed the basis for many of the ballot reform efforts of the 
Progressives and their ideological descendants. This argument has 
been phrased by various courts as a desire to minimize voter confu-
sion, 132 to limit the number of run-off elections, 133 to curb "ballot 
flooding,"134 and to prevent the overwhelming of voting machines.13G 
In essence the ballot size argument stands for the proposition that 
an orderly and compact electoral process will lessen political manip-
ulation and ensure that the election results in a truer expression of 
the will of the majority. 
The argument is not a frivolous one; the reasoning behind it 
is demonstrably sound. There is no question that the state has 
an interest in assuring such ends.136 The problem is that it con-
129. A. HEARD, THE Com OF DEMOCRACY 35 (1960). 
130. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 381 (1971); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 
346, 363-64 (1970). But cf. Bullock v. Carter, 40 U.S.L.W. 4211, 4215 (U.S. Feb, 24, 
1972), for the suggestion that "(t]here may well be some rational relationship between 
a candidate's willingness to pay a filing fee and the seriousness with which he takes 
his candidacy ••• .'' To use this relationship, however, to justify a filing fee would 
necessitate a significant departure from the Court's position in Boddie and Turner. 
131. The seriousness argument was refuted in Thomas v. Mims, 317 F. Supp. 179, 
182 (S.D. Ala. 1970), as follows: 
There is difficulty in how it is to be determined whether a candidate is serious. 
Is a "serious" candidate one who is able to expend a good deal of money on his 
campaigning? If so, this is unacceptable as a standard. The wealth of the individual 
candidate is too cynical a test to be applied to the legitimacy of his effort. A poor 
man may be as "serious" in his campaign as a wealthy one, and has the right to 
seek office with or without capital outlay. 
It is no answer that those candidates without money cannot "seriously" hope to 
win. It may be that modern politics is such that low budgets lose elections; but, 
those with low budgets are entitled to try. 
132. Thomas v. Mims, 317 F. Supp. 179, 181 (S.D. Ala. 1970). 
133. Spillers v. Slaughter, 325 F. Supp. 550, 553 (M.D. Fla. 1970). 
134. Jenness v. Little, 306 F. Supp. 925, 927 (N.D. Ga. 1969), appeal dismissed sub 
nom. Matthews v. Little, 397 U.S. 94 (1970). 
135. Wetherington v. Adams, 309 F. Supp. 318, 321 (M.D. Fla. 1970). 
136. See Bullock v. Carter, 40 U.S.L.W. 4211, 4214-15 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1972), affg, 
Carter v. Dies, 321 F. Supp. 1358 (N.D. Tex. 1970); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 
32-35 (1968). 
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flicts with another widely held notion: equal access to the ballot. 
This conflict is in reality a disagreement on means, since advocates of 
both positions share the common goal of making the political system 
more responsive to citizen demands. The issue, translated into equal 
protection terminology, is whether the values behind the state in-
terest are "compelling" enough to justify infringement on the values 
of equal access to the political system. Under present doctrine, the 
answer is no. Although there admittedly is a legitimate state interest 
in ballot control, fees are neither necessary nor rationally con-
nected to that end. Wealth is not related to any personal character-
istic that would justify keeping individuals off the ballot. It does not 
accurately reflect a candidate's seriousness in running for office. In 
this respect it is therefore arbitrary: there is no more reason to justify 
restricting the ballot on the basis of wealth than there is to restrict 
it on the basis of occupation, hair color, or the size of an individual's 
rock collection. Moreover, there is some indication that the Court 
does not feel that ballot control itself is a compelling interest.137 
On the other hand, our strong aversion to classifications based on 
wealth does give reason to strike down such fees. This reasoning was 
illustrated by the Court in the poll tax cases: ."To introduce wealth 
or payment of a fee as a measure of a voter's qualifications is to intro-
duce a capricious or irrelevant factor. The degree of the discrimina-
tion is irrelevant. In this context-that is, as a condition of obtaining 
a ballot-the requirement of fee paying causes an 'invidious discrimi-
nation' .... "138 Other methods exist that are equally effective in 
regulating the ballot yet do not impose such discrimination.139 Rea-
sonable petition requirements, for example, create classifications that 
are not only less offensive but are also related to the state interest 
they are serving.14° For these reasons, it appears that the ballot control 
137. Finally Ohio claims that its highly restrictive provisions are justified because 
without them a Iar~e number of parties might qualify for the ballot, and the voters 
would then be confronted with a choice so confusing that the popular will could 
be frustrated. But the experience of manv States ..• demonstrates that no more 
than a handful of parties attempts to qualify for ballot positions even when a very 
low number of signatures, such as 1% of the electorate, is required. It is true that 
the existence of multitudinous fragmentary groups might justify some regulatory 
control but in Ohio at the present time this danger seems to us no more than 
"theoretically imaginable." 
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 33 (1968) (footnotes omitted). 
138. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966). 
139. The Court has recognized the availability of alternative means of achieving the 
state's goal as a factor to be considered in judging the validity of state restrictions. In 
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 381-82 (1971), the Court struck down entry fees for 
divorce cases partially on the ground that "other alternatives exist to fees and cost 
requirements as a means for conserving the time of courts and protecting parties from 
frivolous litigation." 
140. Petitions will require that a candidate demonstrate at least minimal public 
support. Therefore, restriction of the ballot on that basis will be likely to keep off the 
ballot only those candidates with no public support. Assuming that the state has some 
interest in keeping candidates with no public support off the ballot, a petition require• 
ment bears some relation to the state interest it purports to serve. See Jenness v. Fort-
son, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1970). 
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argument will not be found compelling enough to ouhveigh the im-
position made on access to the electoral system. The filing fee system 
posited in the model then cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny. 
Yield it must to the rights of the elector and the candidate guaranteed 
by the equal protection clause. 
c. Abandoning the model. It remains only to determine whether 
any variations on the basic model would render a filing fee system 
compatible with the requirements of equal protection. The model 
system imposed fees on general elections. The lower courts have 
generally felt that the imposition of fees in primary elections is ac-
ceptable. This distinction cannot be sustained. The Court has con-
sistently held that in view of the part played by primaries in the 
over-all electoral scheme, constitutional safeguards are equally appli-
cable to both primary and general elections.141 It can no longer be 
argued that the primary election may be conducted by the state with-
out fulfilling equal protection requirements; when the state acts to 
provide and promote primaries, it must comply with the commands 
of equal protection.142 Nor can it be argued that primaries are exempt 
from equal protection strictures if voters are free to choose whomever 
they wish in the general election. As the Court noted in United States 
v. Classic, 143 "the practical operation of the primary law ... is such 
as to impose serious restrictions upon the choice of candidates by 
voters save by voting at the primary election."144 Moreover, even if 
choice were not so restricted, the great practical importance of party 
affiliation in the general election will lead the Court to apply the full 
equal protection guarantee to primary elections.14G 
Indeed, it may be that the individual harm is greater in primaries 
than in general elections since primary candidates are oft_en forced to 
rely more heavily on their own resources. One observer, after exam-
ining several congressional races in California concluded that 
the level of public interest was much lower during the primary cam-
paign, making it more difficult to mobilize resources. Only after cam-
paigns had reached a high level in the autumn did the inexperienced 
workers, smaU contributors, and the normany nonpolitical groups 
volunteer or even respond to the candidates pleas for help. Con-
sequently, candidates could rely less upon the resources that the 
141. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (19:i3): Smith v. Alhvright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); 
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932): Nixon 
v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927). 
142. See Bullock v. Carter, 40 U.S.L.W. 42ll, 4213 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1972), affg. Carter v. 
Dies, 321 F. Supp. 1358 (N.D. Tex. 1970). 
143. 313 U.S. 299 (1941), 
144. 313 U.S. at 313. 
145. Bullock v. Carter, 40 U.S.L.W. 4211, 4215 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1972), a[fg. Carter v. 
Dies, 321 }·. Supp. 1358 (N.D. Tex. 1970). 
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public, parties, or groups could contribute, and had to rely more 
upon their own personal resources.146 
In any event, it is now clear that no filing fee scheme for primary 
elections can be upheld if a similar fee in general elections is uncon-
stitutional. 
Neither should a fee be saved if it is collected by the party rather 
than the state since "the recognition of the place of the primary in 
the electoral scheme makes clear that state delegation to a party of 
the power to fix the qualifications of primary elections is delegation 
of a state function that may make the party's action the action of the 
State."147 Likewise, fees that are used to pay for election expenses 
will be viewed in the same light as those whose proceeds go to the 
general fund. As pointed out above,148 the collection of revenue is 
not a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify the harm caused 
by the fees to individual candidates. 
The amount of the fee appears on the surface to be relevant to 
the equal protection argument. As a logical matter, the amount of 
the harm should decrease as the amount of the fee decreases. There 
are indications in the Carter decision that the Court may have 
adopted this logic,140 but careful analysis shows that this approach 
cannot be sustained. Just as the harm would decrease with the amount 
of the fee, the value of the fee in furtherance of a state interest 
would also decrea,se at a roughly proportional rate. Although there is 
less harm in smaller fees, there is also less justification for their im-
position.150 Even if this were not the case, the apparent judicial dis-
like for determining the reasonableness of fees11i1 would suggest that 
courts will hesitate to draw lines at the other end of the spectrum 
to serve as a basis for determining harmlessness. 
The final manner in which several fee systems differ from the 
model is in their provision for some reasonable alternative method 
for a candidate to appear on the ballot. The courts that struck down 
filing fees stated that such a provision would save the constitu-
· 146. D. LEUTHOLD, ELECTIONEERING IN A DEMOCRACY: CAMPAIGNS FOR CONGRESS 37-38 
(1968). For a further discussion of the importance of primary elections in the democratic 
system, see Comment, supra note 13, at 132-33. 
147. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 666 (1944). 
148. See text accompanying notes 125-27 supra. 
149. See 40 U.S.L.W. at 4215-16. 
150. For example, a fee of S5 may indeed be less damaging to a candidate than a 
fee of S500. But that fee would also be much less effective in furthering the state's in-
terest in raising revenue, ensuring serious candidates, and controlling the ballot. In terms 
of the compelling interest test, the smaller fees would be even less "necessary to" or 
"related to" a state interest than would the large fees. Cf. Turner v. Fouthe, 396 U.S. 
346, 363 (1970). 
151. See pt. IV. A. supra. 
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tionality of the fee system.152 None, however, stated why these sys-
tems would be more compatible with equal protection. The probable 
cause of such omissions is that there is no way to reconcile such op-
tions with the requirements of equal protection. · 
In analyzing the effect of an option provision in filing fee systems, 
the initial question is whether strict scrutiny is required. Any such 
provision would, on the basis of Justice Harlan's terminology,m 
create a "suspect" classification based on wealth by forcing poor can-
didates to take a different path to the ballot than their wealthy oppo-
nents.154 The crucial question is whether there is a state interest 
behind the alternative "compelling" enough to outweigh the harm 
caused to individual voters and candidates. um 
One device that may be used to create an option is a provision 
allowing a voter to write in the name of any candidate not on the 
ballot.11m But this mechanism does not lessen the harm caused a can-
didate or voter by a filing fee system since it is in reality no option 
at all. Justice Douglas recognized this in his concurring opinion in 
Williams: "[T]he write-ins are no substitute for a place on the ballot" 
for "[tlo force a candidate to rely on ·write-ins is to burden him 
with disability. It makes it more difficult for him to get elected, and 
for voters to elect him."157 In a similar vein an earlier observer re-
marked that 
the right is of no value except when exercised in a concerted move-
ment, when it sometimes results in the nomination or election of the 
candidate. It should be pointed out, though, that this is infrequent, 
and the candidate whose name is not printed on the ballot stands 
little chance of election or nomination, as the case may be.1GS 
The effective result is that the classification caused by the fee is un-
changed, and the system remains void under the equal protection 
clause. 
152. See Carter v. Dies, 321 F. Supp. 1358, 1362 (N.D. Tex. 1970), affd. sub nom. 
Bullock v. Carter, 40 U.S.L.W. 42II (U.S. Feb. 24, 1972); Georgia Socialist Workers 
Party v. Fortson, 315 F. Supp. 1035, 1041 (N.D. Ga. 1970), affd. on other grounds sub 
nom. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971); Thomas v. Mims, 317 F. Supp. 179, 182 
(S.D. Ala. 1970); Jenness v. Little, 306 F. Supp. 925, 929 (N.D. Ga. 1969), appeal dis• 
missed sub nom. Matthews v. Little, 397 U.S. 94 (1970). 
153. See text accompanying notes 98-101 supra. 
154. The Court has often held that a scheme need not completely eliminate electoral 
rights in order to violate equal protection. See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 
(1968); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
155. See text accompanying note II4 supra. 
156. See, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN, § 6.1737(4) (1956), which reads: "If the elector wishes 
to vote for a candidate not on any ticket, he may write or place the name of such can• 
didate on his ticket opposite the name of the office and make a cross (X) in the circle 
under the party name." 
157. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 37 (1968). 
158. J. HARRIS, ELECTION ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 176 (1934), 
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A second proposed option is to allow a candidate to file a pauper's 
affidavit in lieu of paying the fee.159 It may be argued that such a 
provision greatly reduces any harm by allowing a poor candidate an 
easy method of getting on the ballot. The stigma of filing such an 
affidavit, however, will cause some initial harm by deterring candi-
dates from filing; further, it may lessen their chance of success by 
lowering their public reputation. More importantly, such a scheme 
destroys whatever initial justification there is for fees. If, as noted 
above, the only possible justification for a filing fee is to control 
ballot size, a system that allows candidates to get on the ballot by 
filing an affidavit cannot truly be said to reach that goal. It can in-
stead be intended only to stigmatize and discredit poor candidates160 
or to raise revenue from the wealthy,161 both of which are improper 
objectives for an electoral regulation. This option therefore is not 
justified by a compelling state interest and is ineffective to save the 
constitutionality of a fee system under the equal protection clause. 
The final and most widely used option would allow a candidate 
to submit a filing fee in lieu of nominating petitions.162 This pla~ 
would reduce the individual harm by allowing a poor candidate to 
reach the ballot without any particular stigma attaching to nonpay-
ment of the fee. The fact remains, however, that a poorer candidate 
is put at a definite disadvantage by law since he must demonstrate 
a degree of support prior to the election while a person paying the 
fee need demonstrate none. The harm, though reduced, is still 
sufficient to outweigh the state interest since the latter is even less 
compelling under this plan than under a mandatory fee system. 
Under a mandatory plan, the fee could at least be justified as a 
method of controlling ballot size. The petition option does not 
offer that justification since ballot control will be achieved primarily 
through petitions rather than fees. The state has thus recognized the 
availability and validity of petitions as a method of control. The 
only justification for the fees under the plan would be to reduce 
the state's workload in validating and checking the petitions. This 
159. Presently the only statute with such a provision is TEX. ELECT10N CODE art. 
13.07a (Supp. 1971), which provides: 
If a candidate is unable to pay the deposit or filing fee ••• in lieu of payment he 
may file ••• a petition of voters ••• [which] shall be accompanied by the following 
affidavit: "I am not financially able to pay the filing fee required to file for the 
office set forth in the attached petition. In lieu thereof I submit the following 
petition •••• " 
160. The Court has in the past struck down statutes that tend to stigmatize or em• 
barrass certain groups. Cf. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 
(1943). 
161. Similarly, revenue raising cannot be considered a compelling state interest. 
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
162. See, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 6.1163 (Supp. 1971), which reads in part: "To 
obtain the printing of the name of any person ••• upon the official primary ballots 
• • • there shall be filed • • • nominating petitions . • . • In lieu thereof, a filing fee of 
$100.00 ...... 
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would clearly be an insufficiently compelling interest to justify the
disadvantage to which poorer candidates are put. 0 3
V. SUMMARY
The Progressive movement gave great impetus to the belief that
the democratic ideal could be attained only if the mechanics of the
electoral process allow the voter to make a reasoned choice at the
polling place. This goal could be best achieved by making the opera-
tion of voting as simple as possible and by ensuring close supervision
of elected officials. In later years, many segments of the society came
to view access to the political system as the best way of carrying
forward democratic principles. Although these ideas are not mutually
exclusive, they did come into conflict upon the question of candidate
filing fees.
The courts have now been forced under the rubric of the equal
protection doctrine to consider this conflict in values. While they
have differed in their outcomes, a proper analysis of the problem
under equal protection doctrine shows that ballot access is given
priority by the Constitution. This analysis also discloses that all fee
systems presently in use, despite their individualized and differing
content, are invalid under equal protection standards.
163. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 US. 618, 634-35 (1969), in which tile Court re-
jected the argument that such administrative considerations are compelling state In-
terests.
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